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8TATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from orders of the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, granting defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss and Motion For Summary Judgment. This court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) . 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
Defendants Resource Design & Construction, Inc. and Timothy 
Hoagland submit that the following issues are before this court 
on appeal: 
1. Whether this court should strike all or some of the 
appeal and impose sanctions for Maacks' complete failure to 
comply with Rule 24(a)(9), Utah R. App. P. Fackrell v. Fackrell, 
740 P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987). 
2. Whether the district court correctly ruled that Maacks 
failed to present evidence supporting the essential elements of a 
negligence claim and defendants were entitled to summary judgment 
as a matter of law. 
Standard of Review: This court will analyze the facts 
and inferences in the light most favorable to the 
losing party and review the district courts 
conclusions of law for correctness. Copper State 
Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance & Furniture Co., 770 
P.2d 88, 89 (Utah 1988); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 
245, 247 (Utah 1988). 
1 
3. Whether the district court correctly ruled that, in the 
absence of a viable negligence claim, Maacks' res ipsa loquitur 
claim also failed as a matter of law. 
Standard of Review; This court will analyze the facts 
and inferences in the light most favorable to the 
losing party and review the district court's 
conclusions of law for correctness. Copper State, 770 
P.2d 88, 89; Madsen, 769 P.2d 245, 247. 
4. Whether the district court never reached Maacks' Motion 
For Summary Judgment on res ipsa loquitur, precluding any 
appellate review of Maacks' claim that they are entitled to 
application that doctrine. 
5. Whether, even assuming Maacks are entitled to a ruling 
on the applicability of res ipsa loquitur, they have failed to 
cite undisputed facts in the record establishing the required 
elements as a matter of law. 
Standard of Review: This court will analyze the facts 
and inferences in the light most favorable to the 
losing party and review the district court's 
conclusions of law for correctness. Copper State, 770 
P.2d 88, 89; Madsen, 769 P.2d 245, 247. 
6. Whether the district court correctly ruled that Maacks 
failed to present evidence supporting the required elements of a 
strict liability claim and defendants were entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law. 
2 
Standard of Review: This court will analyze the facts 
and inferences in the light most favorable to the 
losing party and review the district court's 
conclusions of law for correctness. Copper State, 770 
P.2d 88, 89; Madsen. 769 P.2d 245f 247. 
7. Whether the district court correctly dismissed Maacks' 
implied warranty of habitability claim on the basis that Utah has 
not adopted such a warranty in the sale of residential property. 
Standard of Review: In reviewing an order of 
dismissal, this court will take the factual allegations 
of the Complaint as true and consider them and all 
reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the 
plaintiff. Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., 779 P.2d 
668, 669 (Utah 1989). The district court's conclusions 
of law are reviewed for correctness. 
8. Whether, even assuming Utah were to adopt an implied 
warranty of habitability in the sale of residential property, 
Maacks' claim was properly dismissed because defendants were not 
builder/vendors. 
Standard of Review: In reviewing an order of 
dismissal, this court will take the factual allegations 
of the Complaint as true and consider them and all 
reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the 
plaintiff. Lowe, 779 P.2d 668, 669. The district 
court's conclusions of law are reviewed for 
correctness. 
3 
9. Whether the district court correctly ruled that Maacks 
failed to present evidence supporting the required elements of a 
claim for negligent misrepresentation and defendants were 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
Standard of Review: This court will analyze the facts 
and inferences in the light most favorable to the 
losing party and review the district courts 
conclusions of law for correctness. Copper State. 770 
P.2d 88, 89; Madsen. 769 P.2d 245, 247. 
10. Whether the district court correctly ruled that Maacks 
failed to present clear and convincing evidence supporting a 
claim for intentional misrepresentation. Kohler v. Garden City. 
639 P.2d 162 (Utah 1981). 
Standard of Review: This court will analyze the facts 
and inferences in the light most favorable to the 
losing party and review the district court's 
conclusions of law for correctness. Copper State, 770 
P.2d 88, 89; Madsen. 769 P.2d 245, 247. 
11. Whether Maacks' failure to exercise reasonable, 
ordinary diligence, which would have prevented all alleged 
damages, precluded their misrepresentation claims. 
Standard of Review: This court will analyze the facts 
and inferences in the light most favorable to the 
losing party and review the district court's 
conclusions of law for correctness. Copper State, 770 
P.2d 88, 89; Madsen. 769 P.2d 245, 247. 
4 
12. Whether the district court correctly ruled that based 
on the undisputed facts, Maacks failed to exercise reasonable 
ordinary diligence as a matter of law. 
Standard of Review: This court will analyze the facts 
and inferences in the light most favorable to the 
losing party and review the district court's 
conclusions of law for correctness. Copper State, 770 
P.2d 88, 89; Madsen, 769 P.2d 245, 247. 
13. Whether Maacks' appeal of the district court's denial 
of their Motion For Partial Summary Judgment on Resource Design's 
Counterclaim is moot, as a result of the dismissal of the 
Counterclaim, and, therefore, not properly subject to appellate 
review. 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah R. App. P., which states in pertinent 
part: 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain 
contentions and reasons of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented, with 
citations to the authorities, statutes, and 
parts of the record relied on. 
Rule 12(b)(6), Utah R. Civ. P., which states in pertinent 
part: 
(6) Failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted . . . . 
Rule 56(c),(e), Utah R. Civ. P., which state in pertinent 
part: 
5 
The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
(e) Supporting and opposing affidavits shall 
be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that 
the affiant is competent to testify to the 
matters stated therein . . . . When a motion 
for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may 
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials 
of his pleading, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If 
he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellees Resource Design and Timothy Hoagland supply the 
following Statement of the Case because the Statement provided by 
Appellants Robert and Judith Maack is incomplete, incorrect, and 
largely unsupported by the record. 
A. Nature of the Case, 
This is a case brought by purchasers of a home (Robert and 
Judith Maack) against both the original owner/seller (Dr. Robert 
Jarvik) and the contract builder (Resource Design & Construction, 
Inc. and its president, Timothy Hoagland) to recover damages for 
alleged defects in the home. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below, 
On or about June 1, 1990, plaintiffs/appellants Robert Maack 
and Judith Maack ("Maacks") filed a Complaint against Resource 
6 
Design & Construction, Inc ("Resource Design") and its 
president, Timothy Hoagland ("Mr, Hoagland" The Complaint 
a l l e q i if '" I1,,,,,,,"" II ,,, I I, „ I i ,„„ InJkif.f „ I I I "I „,h„.f 
Resource Design and Mr. Hoagland. It contained claims for 
negligent "design construction," "breach of warranty," and 
"neg 1 i gen I MI I i 
demanded compensatory damages for "diminished value" in the 
amount of $250,000 and punitive damages in the amount «: 
$:i 00. 0C 3 I !: - , I 2 5 
Resource Design and Mr. Hoagland subsequently filed an 
Answer and Resource Design filed a Counterclaim against Maacks 
coi ita i i li i lg ::,] ai lis fi breach oi I tr ac t, I n lji is t: • = .i lr i ::1: lmei l t: ai :t ::i 
conversion relating t :• certain work Resource Design performed at 
Maacks' request after Maacks purchased the home. Resource Design 
demanded compensatory damages 
at 8-20. Resource Design **. Hoagland filed : ihira Parry 
Complaint against Dr. Jarvik for the purpose of apportioning 
r a u u and including a claim DT imp] 
After Jarvik joined J defendants as i ri::r;i party 
defendan Maacks filed separate lawsuit against Jarvik 
relat i m irehase * i i ,
 J!)( MI nil-, , riiii'iii iiiii .• i • 11 I 11 
consolidate the * cases. t 230. 
Resource Design and Mr. Hoagland subsequent! y fi led a Motion 
To Dismiss the implied warranty and misrepresentation claims 
asserted by Maacks, J? District Court granted the Motion 
Dismiss IIIII < to attempt to 
; 
replead their misrepresentation claim in an amended complaint. R. 
at 548 (a copy of the Order is attached as Ex. A to Maacks/ 
Addendum). The court also consolidated the two separate laws its 
filed by Maacks. Id. Maacks filed their First Amended Complaint 
on November 4, 1991. R. at 304 (a copy is included in the 
Addendum hereto as Ex. "A"). 
Maacks filed a Motion For Partial Summary Judgment on the 
breach of contract claim asserted in Resource Design,s 
Counterclaim. R. at 1121. The District Court denied the Motion 
For Partial Summary Judgment on the grounds that material issues 
of fact remained for trial. R. at 2286 (a copy of the Order is 
attached as Ex. B to Maacks7 Addendum). 
On March 25, 1992, defendants Resource Design and Mr. 
Hoagland filed their Motion For Summary Judgment. R. at 1428. 
Defendant Dr. Jarvik also filed his Motion For Summary Judgment 
on Maacks' claims at the same time. R. at 1616. 
On March 31, 1992, Maacks filed a Motion For Partial Summary 
Judgment On The Issue of Res Ipsa Loquitur. R. at 1740. 
Hearings on the motions for summary judgment filed by 
Resource Design and Mr. Hoagland and Dr. Jarvik were held on May 
6 and 7, 1992. The District Court subsequently granted both 
motions and entered judgments and Rule 52 statements on June 17, 
1992. R. at 2212 and 2140 (a copy of the Rule 52 Statement on 
Resource Design's and Hoagland's Motion For Summary Judgment is 
attached as Ex. E to Maacks' Addendum, that for Jarvik7s Motion 
is attached as Ex. D to Maacks' Addendum). The court never ruled 
8 
on Maacks/ Motion For Partial Summary Judgment ^r The Issue Of 
Res Ipsa Loquitur because it granted defendants' Motion For 
Pursuant :. anopposed Motion of Resource Design (R. *"*• 
22C *:he District urt dismissed Resource Desigr 
< : :e Order , Judgment r Dismissal is included in the 
Addendum hereto as Ex 
C. Statement of Facts, 
1. Response to Maacks' Statement of Facts ~ opposing 
the Motion For Summary Judgment filed ; Resource Design and Mr. 
1 loag] ai 1 :i : 
deposition testimony M required by Rule ta . See, 
R. at 1970-89 appeal, they attempt to support their 
"Statement of Facts1' . "ing to material which i>, '.•imply mil in 
the record and which was never provided to r he District Court for 
review in deciding the Motion For Summary Judgment.-
The entire . ::st paragrapt Maacks taUjnujnt nl huts ," 
consists only ot unsupported allegations, not facts which were 
before the court. Maacks7 Brief ; 
Paragraph 2 incorrectly stat • - : Hoagland was 
general contractor who built Jarvik's house Maacks' Brier, 
- Where depositions are not provided to the trial court and made part of 
the record, the facts contained therein are not legally before the appellate 
court in reviewing summary judgment. In this case, only those undisputed 
facts presented by Resource Design and Mr. Hoagland were actually supported by 
affidavits and deposition excerpts in the record. This court can therefore 
disregard Maacks' "Statement of Facts." See, Conder v. A.L. Williams & 
Associates, Inc., 739 P.2d 634 (Utah App. 1987). 
9 
7. Although it is of doubtful relevance, the statement is 
incorrect. The affidavits of both Dr. Jarvik and Mr. Hoagland 
establish that all parties to the contract understood that 
Resource Design & Construction, Inc. was performing as the 
general contractor and Mr. Hoagland was merely a representative 
of that company. R. at 1513-16, 1522-25. 
Paragraph 3 is unsupported by evidence in the record. The 
deposition transcripts to which Maacks cite were never provided 
to the District Court. The citations to the record are primarily 
citations to unsupported statements in Maacks7 own Memorandum in 
Opposition to Summary Judgment. See. Maacks Brief, pp. 7-9, n.s 
19-23. 
In paragraph 4, Maacks allege that they were told about a 
"builders warranty" prior to executing the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement. Maacks Brief, pp. 9-10. This was disputed. Maclyn 
Kesselring stated in her affidavit that she did not mention a 
"builders warranty" until after Maacks had signed the Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement. R. at 1841. Maacks repeatedly reference 
"defects" in the home without citing any competent evidence in 
the record establishing the existence of any "defects." See, 
Maacks' Brief, pp. 9-13. Dr. Jarvik's Deposition, to which 
Maacks repeatedly cite was never provided to the court or made 
part of the record. 
2. Resource Design's and Mr. Hoagland's Statement of 
Material Undisputed Facts. In support of their Motion For 
Summary Judgment, Resource Design and Mr. Hoagland provided the 
10 
District Court with affidavits and excerpts from deposition 
testimony. Those materials are part of the record. See, R. <it 
i were i i »m 
the pleadings, 1nterrogatories, affidavits ^na depositions in the 
record. 
1 . Il I ' d I II Ill, I l l R C S O H I I i V | 1 '€»S J r u n I,, ' ' "' " 
("Resource Design") has been a Utah corporatic
 ; . . standing 
since approximate! y 1 979 se e , Hoagland Affidavit, f 2, I t. at 
1 5] I Resour ze De si gi i :ii t:l: I = i 
contracting, primarily :i i I the areas of custom residential homes 
and light commercial buildings. See, Hoagland December 3, 19 91 
ie]i: i :> J t: J • : i j: 1 5: 3 1 0 I t I: Il 19 3 . 
2. From 1986 to the present, defendant Timothy Hoagland 
has been a shareholder ai id president of Resource Design. See. 
Hoagi - k if: I : \ i <l,i" i I ,„ 'f|| " ,„ ! Il ! '". Il II 
3. In early 1986 Pr, Robert Jarvik (defendant and third-
party defendant) approached Resource Design ; request that It 
bin Lull hi in ci  personal residence it -ll'ii IJIiii! :e 
City. See. Jarvik Affidavit 1 ,! , R. at l1. 
4. Dr. Jarvik subsequently contacted a professional house 
i J e s 111 m > i i e c u mullein j ( " '" • "' 11 i i I nes i i j i i , D r J an : i II :: p i : • = = =ii i te< I 
hi s c: wn drawings or *-:.r house he wanted to bui Id t :> the house 
designer who then assisted Jar^ preparing the plans. See, 
Jarvi .,ztidavi t , f 3 I t I : 1! 523 
5. On or about Jul > 1 , 198 6, Resource Design entered a 
standard f :: r in agreement between owner and contractor with Dr. 
Jarvik to construct a home for Jarvik. See, Hoagland Affidavit, 
5 3, R. at 1514. When he signed the agreement, Dr. Jarvik 
understood that Tim Hoagland was signing it in his capacit as a 
representative of Resource Design & Construction, Inc. ar not in 
a personal capacity. See, Jarvik Affidavit, I 4, R. at J23. 
6. Dr. Jarvik understood that, in all his dealings with 
Tim Hoagland, Mr. Hoagland was acting as a representative of 
Resource Design & Construction, Inc. Dr. Jarvik never believed 
he was dealing with Tim Hoagland in Mr. Hoagland's personal or 
individual capacity. See, Jarvik Affidavit, I 5, R. at 1523-24. 
7• Resource Design completed construction of Jarvik's home 
one year later, in the beginning of July, 1987. See, Hoagland 
Affidavit, 5 5. R. at 1514. Dr. Jarvik was very satisfied with 
the work done by Resource Design and believed the completed house 
was beautiful. See, Jarvik Affidavit, 5 6, R. at 1524. 
8. Due to a job change, Dr. Jarvik moved from Salt Lake 
City to New York City in the summer of 1987. He consequently 
listed the completed home for sale. See, Jarvik Affidavit, 5 7, 
R. at 1524. 
9. Dr. Jarvik arranged to have someone live in the home 
through the winter of 1987-1988 and subsequently rented the home 
for a short period of time in the summer of 1988. See, Jarvik 
Affidavit, 5 8, R. at 1524. 
10. At the end of July, 1988, plaintiffs Robert and Judith 
Maack contacted the listing agent on Jarvik's home and, after 
looking at the house, entered into a Earnest Money Sales 
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Agreement for the fill 1 asking price of $ 595,000.00 The Sales 
Agreement specified that plaintiffs were purchasing the home "as 
conditi on. S e e, Jarvik 
Affidavit, \ L U I plaintiffs executed the 
Agreement (Ex, H to Maacks' Addendum, R at ] 54 0-4 3) they first 
i i in I II II i I  iii in t ;\f R = . s ::  i iree Design & 
Construction, Inc. See, Judith Maack December a 1QQ1 
deposition t 198. 
11. ™> 
purchase contingent upo satisfactory inspection repori. See, 
Maack Affidavit 759-61; Agreement, -
I he 
real estate agent that builders warranty existec ~> .iCver 
requested written confirmation of surh varrant^ ^r _*„ details. 
See:
 r | faaek 
12. None of :T.<> alleged defects i i I the home were latent. 
They al 1 won] d '"i *v*> been discovered toy a reasonable inspection at 
1 III! I  mi iiiiiE I laac: J :s = I la; ::i I:::l I i 
inspection prior to committing to purchase the home "as ~" *~}rr 
Maacks would have avoided
 Aj.l of their alleged damages. See, 
Mdri- » • • Il , I1 in I I  » . 
Plaintiffs' first contact with Resource Design or Tim 
Hoagland came - about August in, I^HR, when Mr. Hoagland sent 
1 . • in i mi | 1 1 1 
Construction, Inc." conveying information the alarm system for 
the home. See, Hoag 1 and Affidavit, \ u, x\. ac 1514-15. Mr. 
13 
Hoagland never represented to plaintiffs in any of his 
communications with them that he was acting in any capacity other 
than as a representative of Resource Design. See. Hoagland 
Affidavit, 5 7, R. at 1515. 
14. After closing on the house and moving in, plaintiffs 
asked Resource Design to perform certain construction work on 
their home. See. Hoagland Affidavit, 5 8, R. at 1515. Prior to 
completion of the work, the Maacks never indicated to Resource 
Design that they did not intend to pay for the work. See, 
Hoagland Affidavit, R. at 1320. After Resource Design performed 
substantial work on plaintiffs' home and submitted a bill, 
plaintiffs refused to pay for the work done. See, Robert Maack 
deposition, pp. 285-286, R. at 1504; Hoagland Affidavit, 5 9, R. 
at 1515. 
15. After Resource Design stopped performing work for the 
Maacks, the Maacks waited over one and a half years before 
engaging another contractor to work on the home. R. at 1511 and 
1515. 
16. On or about June 6, 1990 Maacks filed this lawsuit 
against Resource Design & Construction, Inc. and Timothy Hoagland 
for breach of express and implied warranties, negligence, and 
misrepresentation. See. Complaint, R. at 2. 
8UMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Maacks' Brief contains eight numbered arguments relating to 
their claims against Resource Design and Mr. Hoagland. Six of 
these arguments, however, fail to cite evidence in the record 
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supporting their claims as required by Rule 24(a)(9), Utah R. 
App : remaining arguments are directed towards the 
» " m l i s u n mi . o i l Il I 1 , 1 I  11 II in ' i I in 11 i I 
court «ey i.-e obviously moot these grounds, this court 
may decline review of all eiqht arguments, 
II ' I | | l l I I I I ' ,11 |, II II III III III l,!!1 
Brief -z should nonetheless affirm the district court.' • Summary 
Judgment *>**•*• of Maacks7 claims. 
a 
facie case or negligence. While this court can affirm summary 
judgment -
 ?r.r + >,;** finds support -**'=> "ecord, 
i.. • I .1 1. i I •. - i 
that Resource Design and Mr. Hoagland owed a duty to Maacks to 
protect them from economic loss. 
Maack ' res ipsa loquitur claim f ^ 
as the underlying negligence claim. Accordingly, the district 
court never ml'"1 1 « n Maacks7 Motion For Partial Summary Judgment 
Issue ol HHIJ Ipsa Loquitur and there i s no appealable 
order on this issue. Even assuming the negligence claim were 
viable, Maacks have failed to present sufficient competent 
evidence to establish a J I Il l.liu elements necessary I upput I: 
application of res ipsa loquitur and the facts they did present 
were directly disputed. 
Maacks have failed t^ present any evidence supporting the 
requisite elements of a strict liability claim. Resource Design 
and Mr. Hoagland were not sellers of a product in an unreasonably 
dangerous condition which caused physical harm. 
Maacks' implied warranty of habitability claim was properly 
dismissed because Utah has not adopted an implied warranty of 
habitability in the sale of residential property. Even in states 
which have adopted such a warranty, the allegations of the 
Complaint in this case did not satisfy the elements required of 
such a claim. 
Maacks have failed to cite to any evidence the record 
supporting the elements of an intentional or negligent 
misrepresentation claim. In addition, their own failure to 
exercise reasonable, ordinary diligence precludes their 
misrepresentation claims. 
The district court correctly ruled that, based on the 
undisputed facts, Maacks failed to exercise reasonable, ordinary 
diligence which, by Maacks' own admission, would have prevented 
all their alleged damages. 
For these reasons the district court's Summary Judgment and 
Order of dismissal should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Maacks' Brief on appeal includes eight arguments directed 
towards Resource Design and Mr. Hoagland. Of these eight 
arguments, six should be disregarded or stricken for failure to 
comply with Rule 24, Utah R. App. P. Rule 24(a)(9) provides that 
the brief of the appellant "shall contain the contentions and 
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reasons of the appellant wi th respect to the issues presented, 
with citations to + *• authorities, statutes and parts of the 
record relied on," i : "Briefs which are i iot in 
compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua 
sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees 
against the offending lawyer." 
In Demetropolous v. Vreeken. 754 P.2d 960, 961 (Utah App. 
1988), the Court of Appeals stated: 
Counsel should be aware that appellate courts 
beginning to overcome their trepidation about 
dismissing appeals and imposing sanctions for failure 
to comply with these procedures. For example in 
KushnerTv. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co.. 620 F.2d 404, 407 
(3d Cir. 1980)], while acknowledging the 
' institutional' and 'precedential' impact of its 
decision, found that counsel's 'refusal, failure or 
unwillingness to master (the court's) procedures' 
necessarily required dismissal of the appeal and 
imposition of sanctions for failure to file an appendix 
in conformity with court rules. Id. at 407. More 
recently, this court chose to disregard an inadequa 
brief and premised its affirmance, in part, on the 
failure of the brief to comply with our rules. Koulis 
v. Standard Oil Co.. 746 P-2d 1182, 1185 (Utah App. 
1987) . 
Consistent w. . .4-w .jurt of Appeal£ "»sei \\\ i ./ , 'n. JS 
also declined address the merits of an appeal where the 
appellant's brief * -; - - - * ontain citations t n t he record. See 
Fackrell v. Fackrell 11'|"" l| I '''": 'es 
i iot provide adequate citations • "he recc-xt * r.i judgment of the 
lower court is presumed to be correct:. ' at x->i8. 
The requirement that arguments on appeal contain speei f:i • :: 
citations to the record i .:> particularly important where, as here, 
appellant must 
point to specific evidence in the record which supports the 
elements of his/her claims. Bare allegations, unsupported by any 
facts, are not sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Mas jey 
v. Utah Power & Light. 609 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1990). Maacks 
have completely failed to meet this requirement. 
Point I of Maacks' argument, relating to summary judgment on 
their negligence claim, does not contain even a single citation 
to the record. Point II, relating to summary judgment on res 
ipsa loquitur, contains only one citation to the record. Maacks' 
Brief, p. 23, n. 54. Point III, relating to summary judgment on 
strict liability, again contains not one single citation to the 
record. Point IV, relating to dismissal of Maacks' implied 
warranty claim, contains no citations to the record. Point V, 
relating to summary judgment on Maacks7 misrepresentation claim 
is the same - there are no citations to the record, only bare 
allegations. Point VI, again directed toward the summary 
judgment, contains one sole citation to the court's Rule 52 
statement. There are no citations to evidence in the record 
supporting Maacks' argument under Point VI.2' Maacks' complete 
failure to cite to the record in their argument warrant 
affirmance of the district court's summary judgment and the 
imposition of sanctions under Rule 24(k) Utah R. App. P. 
Even if this court were to reach the merits of Maacks' 
appeal, the district court's order of dismissal and summary 
- As explained in Point VII of this Brief of Appellees, infra, the 
remaining Points VII and VIII of Maacks' argument are moot and not subject to 
review on appeal. 
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judgment should nonetheless be affirmed for the reasons set forth 
in I-tie following points ~:f argument submitted by appellees 
R e s i ji hi i H L i e s I I J I I (iiiiiiii I  '"!" 
P O I N T I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT MAACKS' 
NEGLIGENCE CLAIM FAILED AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Under Point 1 of their Brief, Maacks appear to be arguing 
that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment 
dismissing their negligence claim, Maacks# argumei , 
reads more like an argument in opposition r ; a motion to dismiss 
under ] 2(b)(6) Utah R. Civ. P 
11:1 Celotex v. Catrett, 47 ; ; J s 3ill ; : :Iie \\ 11 • 11 
States Supreme Court defined the burden on a party opposing 
summa \udgment: 
There can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, 
since a complete failure of proof concerning an 
essential element of the non-moving party's case 
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law because the non-moving party has failed to make a 
sufficient showing on an essential element of her case 
with respect: to which she has the burden of proof. The 
standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the 
standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule ::>£ 
Civil Procedure 50(a) . . . . 
To establish a prima facie case of i legligence the plaint, it I in1 st 
show: 
(1) a duty of reasonable ^au ~*cu L : ... defendant to 
the plaintiff; (2) breach of that dut\; ; ) the 
causation, both actually and proximately, of injury; 
and (4) the suffering of damages by the plaintiff. 
Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985). 
While Resource Design's Motion For Summary Judgment on the 
negligence claim was primarily based on the lack of the duty and 
breach of duty elements, Maacks' Brief completely fails to meet 
the burden of proof concerning the all essential elements of 
their negligence claim. It contains not a single citation to any 
evidence in the record which they claim supports their negligence 
claim. Maacks' Brief, pp. 5-8. 
The First Claim for Relief in Maacks' First Amended 
Complaint alleged that the Resource Design and Mr. Hoagland were 
negligent in failing "to properly design, supervise, construct, 
warn and inspect the construction" the home Maacks purchased from 
Dr. Jarvik. Maacks alleged they are entitled to recover damages 
in excess of $250,000.00 for the "cost of repair" to the home and 
"the diminished use and enjoyment of their home." See, First 
Amended Complaint, R. at 304.-7 Maacks did not claim any 
personal injury. See, R. at 1503. Maacks' claims are clearly for 
economic loss. 
Economic loss has been defined as: 
damages for inadequate value, costs of repair 
and replacement of the defective product, or 
consequent loss of profits without any claim 
of personal injury or damage to other 
property . . . as well as the diminution in 
the value of the product because it is 
- In his deposition, plaintiff Mr. Maack was asked to identify any 
property damage allegedly resulting from defendants' acts or omissions. The 
only property damage Mr. Maack identified was negligible water damage to a few 
books (which plaintiffs do not care about replacing), the cost of cleaning 
some suits (no more than $50.00), the cost of cleaning some carpet and the 
cost of replacing an allegedly water-damaged couch. See, Robert Maack depo., 
pp. 31-32 (R. at 1503). If Maacks wish to pursue claims for these damages, 
they should do so in small claims court. 
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inferior in quality and does not work for the 
general purpose for which it was manufactured 
and sold. 
2314 Lincoln Park West Condo. v. Mann. 555 N.E.2d 346, 348 (111. 
1990). 
Like the overwhelming majority of states, Utah recognizes 
the distinction the law has drawn between tort and contract law 
embodied in the "economic loss rule." In Wadsworth Construction 
v. Salt Lake County. 818 P.2d 600 (Utah App. 1991), the plaintiff 
was the unsuccessful bidder on a public works project in Salt 
Lake County and brought suit against Salt Lake County for damages 
on contract and negligence theories. The trial court awarded 
plaintiff damages for lost profits on a motion for summary 
judgment and the county appealed. The Utah Court of Appeals 
reversed and remanded stating: 
"We adopt the majority approach and hold that 
damages for lost profits are not recoverable 
under a negligence theory as a matter of Utah 
Common Law." 
Id. at 602. 
The economic loss rule marks the fundamental boundary 
between tort and contract law. Contract law is designed to 
enforce expectancy interests created through an agreement between 
private parties. Tort law, in contrast, seeks to protect 
citizens and their property from physical harm by imposing a duty 
to exercise reasonable care. See, Sacramento Regional Transit 
District v. Flexible, 158 Cal. App. 3d 289, 204 Cal. Rptr. 736, 
739 (1984). In short, the economic loss rule holds that one may 
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not recover "economic" losses under the theory of non-intentional 
tort. 
Traditionally, interests which have been 
deemed entitled to protection in negligence 
have been related to safety or freedom from 
physical harm • . . However, where mere 
deterioration or loss of bargain is claimed, 
the concern is with a failure to meet some 
standard of quality. The standard of quality 
must be defined by reference to that which 
the parties have agreed upon. 
Crowder v. Vandendeale. 564 S.W.2d 879, 880 (Mo. 1989) [emphasis 
added.] 
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court applied the 
economic loss rule in East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica 
Delaval, Inc.. 476 U.S. 858 (1986). In that case a set of $1.4 
million steamship turbines disintegrated because the manufacturer 
had installed certain key components backwards. There was, 
however, no damage to persons or property other than the turbines 
themselves. The ship owner brought suit against the manufacturer 
under the theories of contract, negligence and strict liability, 
seeking to recover the cost to repair the turbines and lost 
profits. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the trial 
court's order dismissing the negligence and strict liability 
claims. 
In East River, the Supreme Court determined that economic 
loss is best "left entirely to the law of contracts." It focused 
on the need to keep tort and contract law in "separate spheres, 
and to maintain a realistic limitation on damages." 476 U.S. at 
871. The Court specifically noted that the distinction made by 
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the economic loss rule is not actually based on the nature of the 
injury, but rather focuses on the question of whether the 
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff to guard against the 
particular type of injury. Id.-7 
A clear majority of states have recognized the economic loss 
rule and applied it in construction cases similar to this one. 
In Crowder v. Vandendeale, the Missouri Supreme Court considered 
a case in which a subsequent purchaser of a home brought an 
action against the contractor who built the house to recover 
damages for the contractors alleged failure to construct the 
house in a good, workmanlike manner. The Court held that the 
"liability imposed for mere deterioration or loss of bargain 
resulting from latent structural defects is contractual . . . " 
and affirmed dismissal of the tort claims against the contractor. 
Id. at 881. 
The Arizona Court of Appeals considered a similar case in 
which a subsequent purchaser of a home brought an action against 
the builder alleging that latent defects in the construction had 
caused severe damage to their home. Nastri v. Wood Bros. Homes, 
Inc., 690 P.2d 158 (Ariz. App. 1984). In Nastri the court held 
that the subsequent purchaser of the home could not recover from 
the builder on the theory of negligence. The court stated that 
where there was no claim for damage to personal property or 
- Maacks now assert in their brief that Resource Design did not raise the 
issue of duty, but only discussed economic loss in their original Memorandum 
In Support of Summary Judgment. Maacks' Brief, p. 19. Apparently Maacks have 
never understood that the economic loss rule focuses on the existence of a 
duty. 
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personal injury, the theory of negligence could not be used. Id. 
at 163. The damage claimed involved the structure itself. The 
court relied on the holding in Crowder, concluding that recovery 
for property damage caused by latent structural defects is not 
actionable in negligence. 
Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf. 441 N.E.2d 324 (111. 1982) is a 
case that is cited frequently for the proposition that a 
plaintiff cannot recover solely economic losses in tort. 
Redarowicz involves a subsequent purchaser who brought an action 
to recover against a builder on the theories of contract, tort, 
fraud, and implied warranty of habitability. The complaint 
alleged that the defendant builder was responsible for faulty 
construction of the plaintiff's residence. Soon after the 
plaintiff purchased the house they discovered that the chimney 
and adjoining brick wall were pulling away from the rest of the 
house. The court held that the subsequent purchaser's economic 
losses consisting of the cost of replacement and repair of the 
allegedly defective chimney, and adjoining wall and patio, were 
not recoverable under the theory of negligence. 441 N.E.2d at 
327. 
The Redarowicz court stated that H[t]o recover in negligence 
there must be a showing of harm above and beyond disappointed 
expectations. A buyer's desire to enjoy the benefits of his 
bargain is not an interest that tort law traditionally protects." 
Redarowicz, 441 N.E.2d at 327 (citing Prosser, Torts § 92, at 613 
[4th ed. 1971]). In the present case, Maacks have shown no harm 
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"above and beyond disappointed expectations." These disappointed 
expectations have no place in tort law, but only in contract law. 
In Colbera v. Rellinger. 770 P.2d 346 (Ariz. App. 1988), the 
court held that a homeowner did not have a negligence claim 
against the contractor for structural defects where the homeowner 
did not allege any personal injuries or damage to property 
already in existence. Id. at 349. The court cited Nastri, 690 
P.2d 158, Crowderf 564 S.W.2d 879, and Redarowicz, 441 N.E.2d 
324, in making its conclusion. 
In Stuart v. Coldwell Banker Com. Group, 745 P.2d 1284 
(Wash. 1987), the members of the Board of Directors of a 
condominium homeowners association brought suit for negligent 
construction of decks and walkways on behalf of both original and 
subsequent purchasers of condominium units. Plaintiffs had not 
suffered personal injuries or property damage. They sought to 
recover the cost of repairs. Holding that a tort recovery was 
an inappropriate remedy for the damages pleaded, the Washington 
Supreme Court further explained: 
Plaintiff homeowners faced with losses that 
are not of their own making presents a 
sympathetic case . . . . We must exercise 
caution, however, that we do not unduly upset 
the law upon which expectations are built and 
business is conducted. 
Id. at 1290; accord Atherton Condo. Bd. v. Blume Development, 799 
P.2d 250, 262 (Wash. 1990). In addition, the Washington Supreme 
Court quoted Justice Traynor in the case of Seelv v. White Motor 
Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965). 
Justice Traynor stated in Seely that: 
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The distinction that the law has drawn 
between tort recovery for physical injuries 
and warranty recovery for economic loss is 
not arbitrary . . . The distinction rests . . 
. on an understanding of the nature of the 
responsibility a manufacturer must undertake 
in distributing his product. He can be 
appropriately held liable for physical 
injuries caused by the defects . . . He 
cannot be held for the level of performance 
of his products . . . 
Id. at 1291. 
Following Justice Traynor's distinction between tort and 
contract law, the court in Stuart recognized that defects of 
quality evidenced by internal deterioration, were in fact 
economic losses. The court decided that since the defects 
concerned expectation interests, the appropriate set of rules 
were in the area of contract law not tort law. Id. The court 
also noted that the imposition of tort liability upon the 
builder-vendor for economic loss would require them to become the 
guarantors of the complete satisfaction of future purchasers with 
whom they had absolutely no contract with. Id. at 1292. 
In addition to the above-mentioned cases, numerous others 
have applied the economic loss rule in addressing tort claims in 
the construction context. See, e.g., Tusch Enterprises v. 
Coffin. 740 P.2d 1022 (Idaho 1987) (purchaser of allegedly 
defective residential duplexes could not recover economic losses, 
including lost rental income and property damage, in negligence 
action against vendors and builder); Washington Courte 
Condominium v. Washington-Golf, 501 N.E.2d 1290 (111. App. 1st 
Dist. 1986) (condo owners' alleged damages constituted solely of 
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economic losses not recoverable in tort absent allegation of 
damage to property or personal injury resulting from allegedly 
defective plumbing fixtures); Atherton Condo. BD. v. Blume 
Development. 799 P.2d 250 (Wash. 1990) (condo owners' alleged 
construction defects constituted economic loss not recoverable in 
tort law). 
Maacks rely heavily on Good v. Christensen. 527 P.2d 223 
(Utah 1974). This is surprising for a number of obvious reasons. 
First, Good did not involve a claim by a subsequent purchaser. 
Furthermore, it was decided on a statute of limitations. The 
court found that suit was barred by a statute limiting claims for 
property damage, wrongful death or personal injury. Id. at 224. 
There was no discussion at all regarding what type of damages 
were alleged. 
The language in Good at which Maacks grasp is simply dicta 
and clearly presumes the existence of a contract and accidental 
physical damage to property or personal injury. Good does not 
discuss liability of a contractor to subsequent purchasers for 
economic loss. 
The clear majority rule and the Utah rule is that no such 
duty exists. - Maacks attempt to ignore the majority rule 
established in cases directly on point and instead try to get 
~ Maacks argue that Good represents a majority position of allowing 
subsequent purchasers to sue a contractor for economic loss and cite as their 
authority a 1981 A.L.R. article. An inspection of the article cited by Maacks 
reveals most, if not all, of the cases cited in that article relate only to 
situations involving "spec builders" or builder/vendors. It is undisputed 
that Resource Design and Mr. Hoagland were not spec builders or 
builder/vendors in this case. They were merely contract builders. 
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around the fatal lack of any contract with Resource Design or Mr. 
Hoagland by mischaracterizing this case as a products liability 
case. In doing this they rely heavily on W.R.H.. Inc. v. 
Economy Builders Supply. 633 P.2d 42 (Utah 1981). That case, 
however, is easily distinguishable on a number of grounds. 
Most obviously, W.R.H. was an action commenced by the 
purchaser of plywood siding against the retailer and manufacturer 
of the siding. Although W.R.H. does not apply strict liability, 
it is clearly a products liability case predating the formal 
adoption of strict liability in Hahn v. Armco Steel. In 
contrast, the present case involves a negligence claim by a 
subsequent purchaser of the home against the contractor who built 
the home on the original owner's property under a construction 
contract with the original owner. Maacks do not dispute that 
there was never a contract between them and Mr. Hoagland and 
Resource Design. W.R.H. is inapposite.& 
- Justice Hall's dissenting opinion in W.R.H, is notable. 
Justice Hall specifically dissented from that portion of the opinion 
which held that the damages suffered by plaintiffs were recoverable on a 
negligence theory. He stated: 
The main opinion quotes Dean Prosser, but excerpts out the crucial 
language. I agree with the general rule that liability for 
negligence includes personal injury and damage to the chattel 
itself. Prosser goes on, however, to state as follows: 
But where there is no accident, and no physical 
damage, and the only loss is a pecuniary one, through 
loss of the value or use of the thing sold, or the 
cost of repairing it, the courts have adhered to the 
rule . . . that purely economic interests are not 
entitled to protection against mere negligence, and so 
have denied the recovery. 
femphasis added.1 W.R.H. 633 P.2d at 47 (J. Hall dissenting) (quoting W.L. 
Prosser, The Law of Torts, S 101 (4th Ed. 1971)). Justice Hall further 
stated: 
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In t h i s case , the qua l i ty of the work defendants were 
obl igated t o perform was defined and e s tab l i shed by the 
construct ion contract with Jarvik. R. at 1527. That contract 
a l s o provided for f i n a l acceptance of the work by the owner. 
Jarvik was f u l l y s a t i s f i e d with defendants7 work and accepted i t 
accordingly. See, Jarvik Af f idav i t , 1 6, R. at 1524. Final 
acceptance under the contract would be meaningless i f an endless 
stream of subsequent purchasers could sue Resource Design and Mr. 
Hoagland at any time in the future. To accept Maacks' argument 
would be to subject a l l custom contractors t o " l i a b i l i t y in an 
indeterminate amount, for an indeterminate t ime, t o an 
indeterminate c l a s s . " Ultra-mares Corp. v. Touche. 174 N.E. 441, 
444 (N.Y. 1931). Such a burden on contract bu i lders would be 
unbearable. 
Resource Des ign's ob l iga t ion to build the house in a 
workmanlike manner e x i s t e d only because of the manifested in tent 
of the defendant (Resource Design) and the o r i g i n a l owner 
(Jarvik) . No contractual ob l iga t ion ran t o the Maacks, who did 
The main opinion seems to accept the notion that "purely economic 
in teres t s" are not recoverable in t o r t , but goes on to say that 
deter iorat ion of a product i s properly to be treated as "property 
damage." 
The general rule i s that when the damage to a product 
r e s u l t s from deter iorat ion , internal breakage, or 
other non-accidental causes, i t i s properly to be 
treated as economic l o s s . 
Id. 
Since W.R.H. was decided in 1981, not one Utah case has followed it. 
The sound analysis of Justice Hall's dissenting opinion, moreover, has since 
been further recognized by the United States Supreme Court in East River 
Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858 (1986) where it applied 
the same reasoning as Justice Hall. 
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not deal with Resource Design. Accordingly, Maacks cannot sue 
for the builder's failure to give them the benefit of the 
bargain. 
The instant case is undisputedly a case in which subsequent 
purchasers of a home are attempting to recover economic loss from 
the contract builder with whom they had no contract. The current 
Utah law, the clear majority of jurisdictions, and the United 
States Supreme Court all recognize that under such circumstances 
no cause of action in negligence exists. The district court 
correctly recognized that Maacks' attempts to hold Resource 
Design and Mr. Hoagland to contractual duties under tort theories 
is inappropriate. In light of Maacks' failure to present any 
evidence supporting the requisite elements of a negligence claim, 
summary judgment was warranted and should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR SEEKING A RULING ON 
APPEAL REGARDING THE APPLICABILITY OF RES 
IPSA LOQUITUR. 
The "Third Claim for Relief" included in Maacks' First 
Amended Complaint was for "declaratory judgment on applicability 
of res ipsa loquitur." R. at 309. It appears that Maacks now 
seek a ruling from this court that the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur applies to the instant case. Maacks' Brief, pp. 22-23. 
It is well established that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
is merely an evidentiary doctrine "created to help plaintiff 
establish a prima facie case of negligence using circumstantial 
evidence." Dallev v. Utah Vallev Regional Medical Center, 791 
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P.2d 193, 196 (Utah 1990). Although Maacks filed a separate 
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment solely on the issue of the 
applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (R. at 1740), 
the trial court never reached the issue because it determined 
that Maacks' underlying negligence claim failed as a matter of 
law. R. at 2216. There is thus no final order of the trial 
court to be appealed from on this issue. The res ipsa loquitur 
was dismissed for the same reason as the negligence claim. 
Even if one were to assume Maacks could have a viable 
negligence claim, they have again failed to cite any evidence in 
the record which could support application of res ipsa loquitur. 
See. Maacks' Brief, pp. 22-23. The single citation to the record 
is to the Affidavit of Melvin Thompson which Maacks submitted in 
support of their Motion For Partial Summary Judgment on the issue 
of res ipsa loquitur. Maacks' Brief, p. 23, n. 54. That 
affidavit, however, is totally insufficient in several aspects. 
First, Mr. Thompson's affidavit is merely a collection of 
unsupported, vague, conclusory statements. R. at 1771-73. He 
states that he has "extensive experience in the field of general 
contracting as reflected in my deposition transcript." R. at 
1772. The deposition transcript is not in the record. This 
statement is wholly inadequate to establish foundation for expert 
testimony. Furthermore, Mr. Thompson's opinion is merely based 
on the bare assertion that he has "inspected numerous defects in 
the plaintiffs' home, most of which are detailed in my deposition 
transcript." Id. Again this statement is wholly inadequate to 
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establish the foundation necessary for an expert opinion for the 
purpose of opposing or supporting summary judgment. 
[A]ffidavits must include not only the expert's 
opinion, but also the specific facts that logically 
support the expert's conclusion . . . . [A] bare 
assertion that the expert has reviewed the facts and 
based his or her opinion on them will not suffice. 
[emphasis added] Butterfield v. Okubo. 831 P.2d 97, 104 (Utah 
1992) . 
Under this court's standards for Rule 56(e) affidavits, Mr. 
Thompson's affidavit is clearly inadequate. Even if one were to 
indulge Maacks and assume that Mr. Thompson's affidavit were 
sufficient to support application of res ipsa loquitur, it was 
directly contradicted by the Affidavit of G. Brent Smith, which 
Maacks, typically, have failed to even mention in their Brief. 
R. at 1933-35. 
The issue of the applicability of res ipsa loquitur was 
never addressed reached by the trial court and is consequently 
not subject to appellate review. Even if it were, however, 
Maacks have failed to cite to any evidence in the record which 
could suffice to defeat the summary judgment entered in favor of 
Resource Design and Mr. Hoagland. Summary judgment on this issue 
should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT MAACKS' 
STRICT LIABILITY CLAIM PAILS AS A MATTER OP 
LAW. 
The Second Claim for Relief included in Maacks' First 
Amended Complaint purported to state a "strict liability" claim 
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against defendants based upon alleged defects in the construction 
of plaintiffs' residence. R. at 3 06. This claim is both 
unsupported by evidence in the record and deficient on its face. 
In Ernest W. Hahn. Inc. v. Armco Steel, 601 P.2d 152, 158 
(Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court adopted the strict liability 
doctrine expressed in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. 
Conger v. Tel Tech, Inc.. 798 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah App. 1990). 
§ 402A provides in relevant part: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective 
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user 
or consumer or to his property is subject to 
liability for physical harm thereby caused to 
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his 
property, if: 
(a) the seller is engaged in the 
business of selling such a product, 
and 
(b) it is expected to and does 
reach the user or consumer without 
substantial change in the condition 
in which it is sold, (emphasis 
added)• 
Hahn. 601 P.2d at 156. (citing Restatement [Second] of Torts). 
Thus, to support a claim for strict liability Maacks are first 
required to submit evidence establishing that Resource Design and 
Mr. Hoagland were sellers of a product. Again, Maacks have 
failed to include in their argument on this claim even a single 
citation to evidence in the record supporting this element. They 
argue this issue as if it were decided on Rule 12(b) motion to 
dismiss, rather than summary judgment. This is not surprising. 
It was undisputed that Resource Design and Mr. Hoagland were 
not "sellers". Resource Design & Construction, Inc. is a 
33 
corporation engaged in the general construction contracting 
business and Mr. Hoagland is the president of the corporation. 
R. at 304, 1493 and 1514. Robert K. Jarvik submitted plans to 
Resource Design for a custom home and subsequently contracted 
with Resource Design to build the home, as his personal 
residence, on real property he owned. Jarvik Affidavit, R. at 
1523. One year after Resource Design completed the home, Maacks 
purchased it from Dr. Jarvik. Jarvik Affidavit, R. at 1524. 
As the trial court correctly recognized, Resource Design and 
Mr. Hoagland are not "spec" builders. Resource Design merely 
acted as general contractor under a contract with the owner, Dr. 
Jarvik. R. at 1514 and 1524. In fact, there is not even an 
allegation in the First Amended Complaint that the defendants 
sold anything. R. at 306-09. 
Secondly, this case does not involve a "product." It is 
well established that most courts have refused to adopt the 
contention that a building is a "product." Papp v. Rocky 
Mountain Oil and Minerals. 769 P.2d 1249, 1253 (Mont. 1989); and 
see, e.g., Messier v. Ass'n of Apt. Owners, 735 P.2d 939 (Haw. 
App. 1987); Charlton v. Dav Island Marina, Inc., 732 P.2d 1008 
(Wash. 1987); McClahanan v. American Gilsonite Co., 494 F. Supp. 
1334 (Dist. Colo. 1980); K-Mart Corp. v. Midcon Realty Group of 
Conn.. Ltd.. 489 F. Supp. 813 (Dist. Conn. 1980) . The minority 
of states which have held that a home may constitute a product 
for the purpose of strict liability have done so only under 
certain, very specific circumstances. Papp, 769 P.2d at 1254. 
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These circumstances are limited to where the buildings or homes 
are prefabricated and mass-produced, and the defendants are in 
the business of selling these type of homes. Id. at 1255; and 
see, e.g., Shipper v. Levitt & Sons. Inc., 207 A.2d 314 (N.J. 
1965). Clearly, this case does not present such circumstances. 
Third, there is simply no evidence in the record, and Maacks 
have cited none, that the home of which they complain was 
"unreasonably dangerous." This too is an essential element 
without which their claim cannot survive. Hahn, 601 P.2d at 156. 
Fourth, as discussed under Point I of this Brief, the 
present case is not one in which personal injury or property 
damage are claimed. By definition, strict liability applies only 
where a defective product causes physical harm to a consumer or 
his property. Hahn, 601 P.2d at 156. As the United States 
Supreme Court specifically held in East River, 476 U.S. 858, and 
as a majority of states have recognized, the economic loss rule 
applies equally to negligence and strict liability claims. 
A case on point is Waggoner v. Town & Country Mobile Homes, 
808 P.2d 649 (Okla. 1990). In Waggoner, mobile home purchasers 
brought an action against a manufacturer and dealer when their 
mobile home suffered repeated problems with ceiling condensation 
during the winter. They sought the replacement cost of the home 
under the theory of strict products liability. The Oklahoma 
Supreme Court cited the reasoning of the United States Supreme 
Court in East River and stated: 
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We adopt this reasoning and hold that in 
Oklahoma no action lies in manufacturers7 
products liability for injury only to the 
product itself resulting in purely economic 
loss. 
Waggoner. 808 P.2d at 653. The court in Waggoner noted that the 
facts of the case before it involved "only economic loss and 
disappointment associated with the manufacturers unsuccessful 
attempts to remedy condensation within consumers' mobile home." 
Because no personal injury or damage to property other than the 
product itself occurred, the court held that no recovery could be 
had under strict liability. Id; see, also. Nobility Homes of 
Texas, Inc. v. Shivers. 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977). 
Unlike Waggoner, the instant case does not involve a mobile 
home, which can be considered a product. Waggoner, however, is 
helpful in demonstrating the proper application of strict 
liability theory to this case if one were, for the sake of 
argument, to assume the custom home built for Jarvik was a 
product. As Waggoner indicates, Maacks' strict liability claim 
would fail even then because it is based on economic loss. 
In their Brief, Maacks7 rely solely on Ernest W. Hahn v. 
Armco Steel. 602 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979), in support of their strict 
liability claim. Without even recognizing the requisite elements 
of a strict liability claim, they mistakenly imply that this case 
is indistinguishable from Hahn. 
Contrary to Maacks7 assertion (Maacks7 Brief, p. 24), Hahn 
did not discuss or recognize any recovery for economic loss. As 
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the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in discussing economic 
loss in Utah products liability law: 
[I]ssues regarding the recovery of damages 
were not before the court in Hahn. The 
parties stipulated to the amount of damages, 
and no specific charges were levelled against 
the elements therein. Also we think it 
unlikely that the court would decide such a 
controversial issue without some discussion 
of the matter. 
James v. Bell Helicopter Co., 715 F.2d 166, 172 (5th Cir. 1983). 
Secondly, the court in Hahn specifically and expressly 
adopted the strict liability doctrine and language of the 
Restatement (Second) Of Torts § 402A, quoted above. Hahn, 601 
P.2d at 156. Under the Restatement language adopted by the Utah 
Supreme Court, the facts in Hahn warranted application of strict 
liability. The court noted that: the defendant (Armco Steel) 
"mass-produced the joists and made the defective welds in its own 
plant"; "sold the products in this case in a defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous to plaintiff"; "defendant engaged in the 
business of selling such products"; and "these products caused 
physical harm to plaintiff and his property." Id. at 158.-' 
These facts are clearly distinguishable from the instant case. 
The trial court correctly found that, based on the 
undisputed facts, Resource Design and Mr. Hoagland were entitled 
to Summary Judgment as a matter of law. Not only did Maacks fail 
- Notably, the 1965 New Jersey case (Santor v. Karaqheusian, Inc., 207 
A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965) which plaintiffs claim is factually similar to the 
instant case held that a manufacturer and seller of defective carpet was 
liable to his purchaser for breach the implied warranty of reasonable fitness. 
Santor did not involve claims against a contract builder under strict 
liability. 
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to allege sufficient facts to support a strict liability claim, 
but they have completely failed to cite to evidence in the record 
supporting any of the elements of such a claim. Accordingly, the 
trial courts ruling should affirmed. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED MAACKS' 
CLAIM FOR BREACH OF AN IMPLIED WARRANTY OF 
HABITABILITY. 
A. Utah has not adopted an implied warranty of 
habitability in the sale of residential property, 
Maacks do not contend that Utah has recognized an implied 
warranty of habitability running to purchasers of residential 
housing• Rather, they argue that Utah courts should now adopt an 
implied warranty of habitability in the sale of residential 
property for the same reasons the court recently adopted such a 
warranty for residential leases. Maacks' Brief, pp. 26-3 0 
(citing Wade v. Jobe. 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991)). As the facts 
of this case demonstrate, however, the circumstances with respect 
to residential leases which this court has recognized as 
supporting adoption of an implied warranty in leases, are clearly 
not present in the purchase and sale of residential property. A 
lease transaction is vastly different from a sale. 
In Wade v. Jobe. this Court noted that it has rejected 
"strict application of traditional property law to residential 
leases, recognizing that it is often more important to apply 
contract law." [emphasis added.] 818 P.2d at 1010. (citing Reid 
v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 896, 902, n. 3 (Utah 
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1989)). Consistent with this the Court rejected the rule of 
caveat emptor in residential leases. Id. It was the Courts 
desire to compensate for the frequently poor bargaining position 
of modern residential tenants which justified its adoption of the 
implied warranty: 
Modern tenants generally lack the necessary skills or 
means to inspect the property effectively or to make 
repairs. Moreover, the rule of caveat emptor assumes 
an equal bargaining position between landlord and 
tenant. Modern tenants, like consumers of goods, 
however, frequently have no choice but to rely upon the 
landlord to provide a habitable dwelling. Where they 
exist, housing shortages, standardized leases, and 
racial and class discrimination place today's tenants, 
as consumers of housing, in a poor position to bargain 
effectively for express warranties and covenants 
requiring landlords to lease and maintain safe and 
sanitary housing. 
[citations omitted.] Wade, 818 P.2d at 1009. 
The most obvious and important characteristic present in a 
residential lease and absent in the sale of a house is the 
ongoing contractual nature of the landlord/tenant relationship. 
Residential tenants, are usually completely dependant on the 
landlord for maintenance and repair of the residence throughout 
the time of their occupation. Purchasers, on the other hand, are 
generally free to perform their own maintenance and repairs as 
necessary - their relationship is not one of continuing 
dependance or reliance. 
The importance of this distinction is further highlighted 
when one considers the unlimited liability that would result if 
implied warranties were imposed on residential sellers. By 
nature of the landlord/tenant relationship, a tenant's cause of 
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action for breach of an implied warranty of habitability must 
arise during the term of the lease. In contrast, if implied 
warranties of habitability were imposed on a seller of a home, a 
purchasers cause of action might not arise until 50, or more, 
years after the sale of the home. Sellers of homes would be 
subjected to the specter of unlimited liability. 
In addition, purchasers and sellers of residential real 
estate are usually in equal bargaining positions. Purchasers are 
free to condition their offers to purchase on a satisfactory 
physical inspection report by a licensed home inspector or 
contractor, or upon express written warranties from the seller. 
In fact, blank spaces for such conditions are specifically 
provided in the form Earnest Money Sales Agreement approved by 
the Utah Real Estate Commission and Utah Attorney General. See R. 
at 1540-43. As this case demonstrates, purchasers who exercise 
due diligence are not in need of the special protection of far 
reaching implied warranties. 
Maacks offered the asking price of $595,000.00 to purchase 
Dr. Jarvik's home. R. at 1541. Maack, an experienced, and 
obviously wealthy attorney, was in an equal, if not better, 
bargaining position than Dr. Jarvik. The Maacks' offer to 
purchase, however, was not conditioned on any express warranties 
or even on a satisfactory inspection report. R. at 1540-43 and 
2214-15. Certainly, a reasonable purchaser, especially one 
paying over half a million dollars, would make use of the blank 
spaces in the Earnest Money Sales Agreement to condition his/her 
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offer on a satisfactory inspection, the cost of which would be 
negligible. 
Maacks have admitted that a reasonable inspection at the 
time of purchase would have revealed all the alleged defects in 
the home and prevented all damages in this case. Maacks7 Brief, 
p. 10; Maack Affidavit, R. at 1761. Maacks clearly had the means 
at their disposal to prevent all their alleged damages, yet, as 
the trial court found, they failed to exercise ordinary 
reasonable diligence. R. at 2216-17. This type of situation 
certainly does not support such an extreme measure as the 
adoption of an implied warranty of habitability in the purchase 
of a residence. It is amazing that Maacks suggest it does. 
B. Even in those other states which have adopted an 
implied warranty of habitability in the sale of residential 
property, the trial court's dismissal of Maacks' claim would be 
correct. 
In those states which do recognize an implied warranty of 
habitability and fitness, it is fundamental that the implied 
warranty only arises from a contractual relation between the 
builder/vendor of the home and the purchaser. See Atherton 
Condominium Apartment-Owners Association v. Blume Development 
Co., 799 P.2d 250, 257-258 (Wash. 1990); Woodward v. Chirco 
Construction Company. Inc., 687 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Ariz. 1984); 
Carpenter v. Donohoe, 388 P.2d 399 (Colo. 1964). The two 
prerequisites of the implied warranty of habitability are: 
First the builder-vendor of the dwelling must 
be a commercial builder. Second, the unit 
must be built for sale, rather than personal 
occupancy, [emphasis added]. 
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Atherton. 799 P.2d at 258, n. 7. In the instant case the second 
of these two prerequisites has not been met. 
While Resource Design is a residential constructic \ 
contractor, it was not a "builder-vendor." As Maacks alleged in 
their First Claim For Relief, "defendants contracted co build and 
construct a residential building." See, Complaint p. 2, R. at 3. 
Resource Design did not construct the subject home for sale and 
Maacks did not allege otherwise. R. at 2-5. It was undisputed 
that Resource Design constructed the home under contract for the 
owner, Dr. Robert Jarvik, who subsequently sold it to the Maacks. 
R. at 1523-24. 
Thus, the question of whether Utah should or should not 
adopt implied warranties in the sale of residences need not be 
decided in this case. Even if Utah courts were to recognize a 
cause of action for breach of an implied warranty of habitability 
and fitness for residential property, the allegations of the 
Complaint in this case failed to support such a claim. The trial 
court correctly dismissed Maacks claim for breach of implied 
warranty of habitability. 
POINT V 
MAACKS HAVE FAILED TO CITE FACTS SHOWING A 
MISREPRESENTATION OF MATERIAL FACT OR RELIANCE DAMAGES 
NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THEIR MISREPRESENTATION CLAIM. 
Under Point V of their Brief, Maacks appear to be arguing 
that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment 
dismissing their claim for "negligent and/or intentional 
misrepresentation." Again, Maacks' argument, reads more like an 
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argument in opposition to a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6), 
Utah R. Civ. P. It contains no citations any evidence in the 
record which they claim supports their misrepresentation claim. 
In Price-Orem. Inc. v. Collins, Brown & Gunnel. 713 P.2d 55 
(Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court described the elements of a 
cause of action for negligent misrepresentation as follows: 
[T]he tort of negligent misrepresentation, 
which provides that a party injured by 
reasonable reliance upon a second party's 
careless or negligent misrepresentation of a 
material fact may recover damages resulting 
from that injury when the second party had a 
pecuniary interest in the transaction, was in 
a superior position to know the material 
facts, and should have reasonably foreseen 
that the injured party was likely to rely 
upon the fact, [emphasis added.] 
Id. at 59 [citations omitted.] See, also. Duaan v. Jones. 615 
P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980). 
Intentional misrepresentation, or fraud, requires that the 
plaintiff, establish by clear and convincing evidence all of the 
following elements: 
1) that a representation was made; 2) concerning a 
presently existing material fact; 3) which was false; 
4) which the one making the representation either a) 
knew to be false, or b) made recklessly knowing he had 
insufficient knowledge upon which to base such 
representation; 5) for the purpose of inducing the 
other party to act upon it; 6) that the other party 
acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; 7) 
did in fact rely upon it; 8) and was thereby induced to 
act; 9) to his injury and damage. 
Kohler v. Garden City. 639 P.2d 162, 165 (Utah 1981) (citing 
Cheever v. Schramm. 577 P.2d 951 (Utah 1978)). 
To warrant overturning the trial court's summary judgment on 
Maacks' intentional misrepresentation claim, Maacks must now 
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demonstrate that, in opposing summary judgment, they presented 
evidence to the trial court which could establish by clear arci 
convincing evidence all of the above elements. They have no 
even come close to meeting this burden. As pointed out abo\*=s, 
their argument contains no citations to the record. Moreover, 
the undisputed facts presented by Resource Design and Mr. 
Hoagland affirmatively demonstrate the lack of the essential 
elements to both intentional and negligent misrepresentation 
claims. 
Maacks based their "negligent and/or intentional 
misrepresentation" claim on defendants' alleged statement that 
they "would stand behind their product and make it right." See, 
First Amended Complaint (Addendum, Ex. "A"); Plaintiffs7 
Memorandum In Opposition (R. at 1985); Excerpt from Robert Maack 
Depo. (R. at 1508-09). 
Maacks7 allegation that Mr. Hoagland misrepresented that 
Resource Design would "stand behind their work and make it right" 
and "promised that they would correct the defects", is clearly, 
at best, an allegation of an unenforceable promise. It is not a 
misrepresentation of "material fact". The mere failure to 
perform a promise will not support a claim for negligent or 
intentional misrepresentation. See, e.g., Cerritos Trucking Co. 
v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608 (Utah 1982); Schow v. 
Guardtone. Inc.. 19 Utah 2d 135, 417 P.2d 643 (1966). 
Resource Design acknowledges that, under some circumstances, 
a statement of an intention to perform or not perform an act in 
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the future can support an action for fraud. The required 
circumstances, however, include that the party making the 
statement did not intend to perform the act at the time he/she 
promised it. Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., Inc., 739 P.2d 
634, 638 (Utah App. 1987) (citing Berkeley Bank for Coops, v. 
Meibos. 607 P.2d 798, 805 (Utah 1980)). Thus, even assuming Mr. 
Hoagland's alleged statement that he would stand behind his 
product and "make it right" were the type of statement which 
could be actionable, Maacks have failed to cite to any evidence 
in the record which would show that Mr. Hoagland did not intend 
to "stand behind his product" at the time he made the statement. 
The evidence which is in the record, in fact, and which was 
brought to the attention of the trial court, actually shows the 
opposite. 
Deposition testimony of Mr. Maack and Mr. Hoagland's 
Affidavit established the undisputed fact that Resource Design 
did subsequently attempt and undertake repair and remodeling work 
at the Maacks' residence. R. at 1509-1510 and 1515. The 
following deposition testimony of Mr. Maack was presented to the 
trial court: 
Q You believe [Mr. Hoagland] tried to fix it, don,t 
you? 
A. There is no question that he went up there and he 
spent some time attempting to fix it, but he selected 
the least expensive ways to do things . . . . 
R. at 1509-10. There is absolutely no evidence in the record 
that, at the time of the alleged misrepresentation, Mr. Hoagland 
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and Resource Design did not intend to "stand behind their product 
and make it right." 
Thus, Maacks' intentional and or negligent misrepresentation 
claims failed for lack of any evidence of a misrepresentation of 
material fact or of a promise, made by one not intending to 
perform. This deficiency, however, was not the only one 
supporting summary judgment on these claims. 
Maacks also failed to present any evidence of the required 
element of reliance damages. See, Price-Orem, 713 P.2d 55, 59; 
Kohler v. Garden City. 639 P.2d 162, 165 (Utah 1981). Maacks now 
argue that Mr. Hoagland,s alleged statement was a tortious 
misrepresentation or "fraud" not only because Resource Design did 
not "properly perform repairs" after promising to do so, but also 
because the statement constituted a promise that the work would 
be done at no cost to Maacks and Resource Design subsequently 
charged plaintiffs for the work. Maacks' Brief, pp. 32-34. 
Maack/s argument consists of nothing more than conclusory 
allegations that they: 
were damaged by their delay in hiring a competent 
contractor to repair the defective work, by 
accommodating Hoagland's schedule and allowing him to 
do the remedial work around other projects, something 
they would not have to tolerate if they were paying for 
the repair work, and by having to defend against a 
frivolous Counterclaim. 
Maacks' Brief, pp. 33-34. The Maacks, however, presented no 
evidence to the trial court that they delayed in hiring a 
"competent contractor" because of Mr. Hoagland's statement. They 
also presented no evidence that the alleged delay caused any 
46 
additional damage to the Maacks.*' See, R. at 1970-75, 1985-88. 
In fact, there is no evidence in the record that the Maacks would 
have hired a different contractor if Mr. Hoagland had 
specifically told them they would have to pay for any work they 
requested. 
Maacks continue to ignore the fact that they cannot say they 
have been damaged by relying on Resource Design's work being free 
because it was undisputed that they failed and refused to pay 
Resource Design anything for the work done! See, Robert Maack 
Depo., (R. at 1504-05); Hoagland Aff., 5 9 (R. at 1513-15). 
Their argument with respect to the Counterclaim, is one that 
should have been directed toward defense of the Counterclaim.27 
It does not establish reliance damage. 
The trial court correctly ruled that the Maacks failed to 
establish the elements of a claim for negligent or intentional 
misrepresentation as a matter of law.—7 
-
7
 Maack's allegations of the severity of defects as well as the existence 
of delay damages are doubtful, at best. The undisputed evidence was that even 
after Resource Design ceased all work for the Maacks, the Maacks waited 
another year and a half years before hiring another contractor. R. at 1515 and 
1511. Maacks, moreover, have lived in the house continuously since they 
purchased it in 1988. 
- Resource Design's Counterclaim survived Maack's Motion For Partial 
Summary Judgment, but was subsequently voluntarily dismissed. R. at 2286 and 
2219. 
—
7
 As discussed under the following point, the trial court also ruled that 
Maacks failed to exercise reasonable, ordinary diligence. This is a further 
basis for granting summary judgment on the misrepresentation claims. See, 
Klas v. Van Wagoner, 829 P.2d 135, 141, n. 9 (Utah App. 1992). 
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POINT VI 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE 
UNDISPUTED FACTS ESTABLISHED MAACKS' LACK OF 
DUE DILIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
In its Rule 52 Statement of Grounds and Order Granting 
Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment Against Plaintiffs, the 
trial court listed material facts to which it found there was no 
genuine dispute and then listed its conclusions of law based on 
those facts. R. at 2212-17 (included as Ex. E in Addendum to 
Maacks' Brief). The following was among the court's conclusions: 
Plaintiffs' failure to ask for a copy or written 
evidence of a "builders warranty," their failure to 
condition their offer to purchase the Home on the 
existence of a "builders warranty" or on the receipt of 
an acceptable inspection report, especially in light of 
Robert Maack's professional training, clearly shows, 
and a reasonable jury could not find otherwise, that 
plaintiffs did not exercise ordinary, reasonable 
diligence. 
R. at 2216-17. Maacks never objected to this conclusion. R. at 
2166-68, 2189-90. 
The court's conclusion was fully supported by undisputed 
facts in the record. Even now, Maacks fail to dispute the 
material facts set forth in the Rule 52 Statement. See, Maacks' 
Brief pp. 34-36. In fact, Maacks again have failed to cite to 
any evidence in the record supporting their argument. 
In addition, Maacks seem to misperceive the district court's 
ruling. The court never ruled that Mr. Maack's negligence was in 
excess of 50%. That issue was not raised below by the parties or 
decided by the district court. What the court concluded was 
that, based on the undisputed facts, Maacks failed to exercise 
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reasonable ordinary diligence. This constituted further legal 
basis for entering judgment against Maacks on their 
misrepresentation and fraud claims pled against Resource Design, 
Mr. Hoagland, and Dr. Jarvik. 
The undisputed facts of this case are virtually identical to 
those of the recent case Klas v. Vanwagoner, 829 P.2d 135 (Utah 
App. 1992) (cert, denied). In that case the plaintiffs, attorney 
Mark Van Wagoner and his wife sought rescission of a real estate 
purchase agreement based on allegations of misrepresentation and 
fraud regarding the appraised value of the property. The Court 
of Appeals stated: 
[W]e find it unreasonable, especially given Mark Van 
Wagoner7s professional training and experience in real 
estate law, for defendants to have failed to obtain an 
independent appraisal prior to executing the Agreement, 
or to have conditioned the obligation to purchase on 
the property appraising at a particular level, if they 
were truly concerned about the property's appraised 
value. Because the defendants failed to conduct a 
reasonable investigation of the subject property's 
market value prior to executing the Agreement, 
defendants' conduct did not rise to the level of 
ordinary diligence . . . . 
[emphasis added.] 829 P.2d at 140-41. The Court of Appeals went 
on to conclude: 
In light of our determination that defendants7 conduct 
did not rise to the level of ordinary diligence, it 
follows that the trial court correctly dismissed 
defendants' counterclaim for fraud and 
misrepresentation. 
829 P.2d at 141, n. 9. 
Just as in Klas, Maack, an experienced attorney, and his 
wife purchased the house "as is." Agreement (included as Ex. H in 
Addendum to Maacks7 Brief) R. at 1540-43. They failed to have an 
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inspection done or to condition the purchase upon an inspection 
or any written warranty. See, Id. They claimed vague oral 
representations regarding a "builders warranty" of unknown 
duration or scope, but expressly disavowed any such 
representations or warranties in the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement. Id. Incredibly, Maacks paid the asking price of 
$595,000 without even attempting to have a professional 
inspection of relatively negligible cost performed. R. at 2452; 
R. at 1540-43. They admit that none of the alleged defects were 
latent and they would have incurred no damages if they had merely 
had the house inspected prior to committing to the purchase. R. 
at 1761; Maacks' Brief, pp. 10-11. 
In short, Maacks acted carelessly and now seek to have 
others pay the price. The court's conclusion that Maacks' failed 
to exercise ordinary, reasonable diligence is supported by the 
undisputed facts and should not be disturbed. 
POINT VII 
THE DENIAL OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIMS 
IS NOT APPEALABLE. 
On February 11, 1992, Maacks filed a Motion For Partial 
Summary Judgment on the first claim for relief (breach of 
contract) asserted in Resource Design's Counterclaim. R. at 
1121. Resource Design subsequently filed a Memorandum In 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment 
together with a supporting affidavit and exhibits. R. at 1309-
27. A hearing was held on April 8, 1992, at which the Court 
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concluded material issues of fact were in dispute, precluding 
partial summary judgment. R. at 2286. 
Resource Design and Mr. Hoagland filed their Motion For 
Summary Judgment on all of plaintiffs/ claims on or about March 
25, 1992. R. at 1428. After oral argument on May 6 and 7, 1992, 
the Court granted summary judgment on all of the Maacks/ claims. 
R. at 2081, 2147 and 2222. Defendant Resource Design then 
voluntarily dismissed its Counterclaim on June 17, 1992. 2219; 
See, Order and Judgment of Dismissal, included in the Addendum to 
this Brief as Ex. "B". Maacks did not object to dismissal of the 
counterclaim in any way. R. at 2208. 
"Because of a longstanding judicial policy in Utah to avoid 
advisory opinions, [Utah appellate courts will] not generally 
consider mooted questions on appeal." Reynolds v. Reynolds, 788 
P.2d 1044, 1045 (Utah App. 1990) (citing Merhish v. H.A. Folsom & 
Assoc.s. 646 P.2d 731, 732 (Utah 1982); State v. Stromauist, 639 
P.2d 171, 172 (Utah 1981); Hovle v. Monson. 606 P.2d 240, 242 
(Utah 1980)). 
The function of appellate courts, like that of courts 
generally, is not to give opinions on merely abstract 
or theoretical matters, but only to decide actual 
controversies injuriously affecting the rights of some 
party to the litigation, and it has been held that 
questions or cases which have become moot or academic 
are not a proper subject to review. 
Reynolds. 788 P.2d at 1045 (citing McRae v. Jackson, 526 P.2d 
1190, 1191 (Utah 1974)). 
Maacks have conveniently failed to inform this Court of the 
fact that Resource Design's Counterclaim was dismissed in its 
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entirety pursuant to the trial court's Order and Judgment of 
Dismissal of June 17, 1992. It was omitted from "The Nature of 
the Case and Proceedings" section of their Brief (pp. 3-5 and 
from the Addendum. 
The question of whether the trial court properly denied 
Maacks' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment on one of the claims 
for relief in Resource Design's Counterclaim is clearly moot. 
Because the Counterclaim was dismissed by the trial court, there 
are no "actual controversies injuriously affecting the rights" of 
the Maacks with respect to any part of the Counterclaim. 
Only where there are related issues of particular public 
interest, or other extraordinary circumstances constituting an 
exception to the mootness doctrine, will a moot issue be reviewed 
on appeal. Cinaolani v. Utah Power & Light Co., 790 P.2d 1219, 
1222 (Utah App. 1990) (citing Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 
899 (Utah 1981); and Reynolds, 788 P.2d at 1045). Maacks have 
not and cannot raise any issues of public interest or 
extraordinary circumstances which would justify review of this 
clearly moot issue. Their appeal of the trial court's denial of 
Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment on the 
Counterclaim should accordingly be dismissed. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this court should affirm the 
district Court,s dismissal of Maacks' implied warranty claim and 
Suinmary Judgment on all remaining claims in favor of Resource 
Design and Mr. Hoagland. 
DATED this s/o day of December, 1992. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
By 
KURT M. FKANKENBURO 
Attorneys for Defendant^ 
Appellees Resource Design & 
Construction, Inc. and 
Timothy Hoagland 
17606 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT D. MAACK and 
JUDITH D. MAACK, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
RESOURCE DESIGN & 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a 
Utah corporation and 
TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
RESOURCE DESIGN & 
CONSTRUCTION, INC. a Utah 
corporation, and TIMOTHY 
HOAGLAND, an individual, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT JARVIK, M.D., 
Third-Party Defendant. 
Defendants. 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 900903201CV 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
The plaintiffs, for cause of action, complain and allege 
as follows: 
000304 
» 1. Plaintiffs are purchasers of a certain parcel of 
real property situated at 4326 White Way, Salt Lake City Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, hereinafter the "S jject 
Property." 
2. The defendant Resource Design and Construct- n Inc., 
i 
is a Utah corporation, fully licensed and authorized to do 
i 
' business in the State of Utah. 
! 
Ij 
j 3. The defendant, Timothy Hoagland, an individual, is 
a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
I 4. Jurisdiction obtains and venue is properly laid in 
,, the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State 
I of Utah. 
i 
I 
;! z -
j FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
t Negligence 
j 5. The defendants, Resource Design and Construction 
M Inc. and Timothy Hoagland, contracted to build and construct 
t j 
il a residential building on the Subject Property. 
i| 6. The defendants, and each of them, were negligent in 
' the design and construction of the subject residence rendering 
>! the subject building defective. 
11 7. The defendants, and each of them, failed to complete 
• i 
i 
, the construction and building in a satisfactory and 
I 
workmanlike manner. 
i 
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8, The defendants, and each of them, failed to warn of 
defects in the design of the residential building on the 
Subject Property. 
9. By reason of the negligence and failure to properly 
design, supervise, construct, warn, and inspect the 
construction of the subject building, the property is 
defective; the costs of repair could exceed $250,000. 
Plaintiffs are also damaged in the diminished use and 
enjoyment of their home. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs seek relief as is hereinafter more 
specifically set forth in plaintiffs prayer for relief. 
II. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Strict Liability 
i 10. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference 
[ each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 9 
i supra. 
i 
| 11. The defendants have constructed a building (i.e. 
}
 personal residence) that is defective both in its component 
J parts and in its entirety. The defects include, but are not 
• limited to the following: 
1. Membranes: 
(1) The waterproof membranes that were 
installed under the roof, decks, parapets and flat 
- 3 -
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! 000306 
surfaces were and are defective in that they are 
not impervious to rain, water, snow or moisture 
resulting in leakage and water damage inside of the 
walls, ceilings and the interior of the home; 
(2) In the alternative, the membranes became 
defective due to improper preparation and 
installation; 
(3) In the alternative, the materials 
selected by defendants were not appropriate for the 
use to which they were put and were installed in 
contravention of the manufacturers instructions and 
specifications rendering the membranes defective 
for the specific use. 
2. Stucco: 
(1) The stucco material covering on the 
exterior walls was and is defective in that it is 
not impervious to rain, water, snow or moisture 
resulting in leakage into the interior walls, 
ceilings, windows, and into the interior of the 
home itself; 
(2) In the alternative, the stucco materials 
became defective due to improper preparation and 
installation; or, 
- 4 -
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I (3) The stucco materials selected by 
j defendants defective in that they were not 
(j appropriate for the use to which they were put and 
1  
j, were installed in contravention of the 
Jj manufacturer's instructions and specifications. 
;i 
'; 3. Adhesives: 
h (1) The adhesive materials used to secure the 
ij 
\ membranes and stucco materials in the structure 
'; were defective in that they fail to possess the 
j1 
,j requisite adhesive and cohesive values necessary to 
I properly secure the component materials; 
(2) In the alternative, the adhesives became 
i 
I defective due to the improper installation; or 
! (3) The adhesive materials selected by the 
1} defendants were not appropriate for the use to 
If j! which they were put and were installed in ii 
il |{ contravention of the manufacturer's instructions 
and specifications. 
il 12. Due to the defects contained in the various 
! i ] I 
;j components of the structure, the entire building is rendered 
ij 
!| defective in that the structure is not waterproof or 
!| weatherproof which results in water damage to the interior 
' ! 
•I 
'j walls and ceilings of the structure and to the contents of the 
.! building (i.e. carpets, furniture, clothing, etc.). In 
I - 5 -
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addition plaintiffs have been damaged in the diminished use 
and enjoyment of their home. 
13. The defects referred to in paragraphs 11 a i 12 are 
unreasonably dangerous. 
14. As a result of the unreasonably dangerous defects, 
plaintiffs suffered damages consisting of the cost to repair 
the defects, the resulting damage they caused, and the 
diminished use of the Subject Property. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs seek relief as hereinafter more 
specifically set forth in plaintiffs' Prayer for Relief infra. 
III. 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Declaratory Judgment on Applicability of Res Ipsa Loquitur 
15. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference 
i each and every allegation contained paragraphs 1 through 14, 
. supra. 
16. Pursuant to §§ 78-33-1 et. seq. Utah Code Annotated 
and Rule 57 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the plaintiffs seek 
declaratory relief; more specifically plaintiffs seek an order 
of the court that the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur shall be 
i 
i applied at time of trial of this case. 
17. The case at bar is particularly appropriate for the 
imposition of the Doctrine for the following reasons: 
1. That the defects are of a kind which, in the 
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ordinary course of events, would not exist had due 
care been observed; 
i 
2. That the plaintiffs1 own use or operation of 
the agency or instrumentality was not primarily 
responsible for the defects, injury and damage; 
3. That the agency or instrumentality causing the 
injury was under the exclusive management or 
control of the defendants until it became sealed; 
and 
4. It would require extensive destruction of the 
residence in order to ascertain the nature and 
i 
extent of the defects. 
j 18. Plaintiffs pray the court apply the Doctrine of Res 
Ipsa Loquitur at time of trial. 
j WHEREFORE, plaintiffs seek relief as hereinafter more 
| specifically set forth in plaintiffs1 Prayer for Relief infra. 
i 
IV. 
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Negligent and/or Intentional Misrepresentation 
19. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference 
each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs 1 through 
18, supra. 
20. Plaintiffs have been injured and damaged by 
negligent and/or intentional misrepresentations of material 
- 7 -
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facts made by the defendant Resource Design and its agent, 
Timothy Hoagland; which misrepresentations are more 
specifically described as follows: 
(1) A Representation was made; (i.e. defendant Resource 
Design and Timothy Hoagland acknowledged that there were 
defects in the design and construction of the home which 
rendered the building defective and in need of repair 
including, but not limited to: that the building leaked 
water into the interior of the home and that the 
structure was not impervious to water. Defendants stated 
that they would "stand behind their work and make it 
right" and promised that they would correct the defects 
in order that the home would be completed in a 
satisfactory and workmanlike manner, free from defects at 
no cost to the plaintiffs.) 
(2) Concerning Presently Existing Material Facts: (i.e. 
that defendants recognized the problems in the 
construction, but stated that they intended to "stand 
behind their work and make it right" and promised to 
correct the defects at no cost to plaintiffs.) 
(3) Which was False: (i.e. defendants did not stand 
behind their work, correct the defects in materials, 
construction and workmanship, nor did they "make it 
right" at no cost as promised.) 
- 8 -
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(4) Which the Representor Either: 
(a) Knew to be false: (i.e. defendants did not 
intend to correct the defects at no cost to 
plaintiff); or in the alternative, 
(b) Defendants made the promise recklessly, 
knowing that they had insufficient knowledge upon 
which to base such representations: (i.e. when 
defendants made the representation that the defects 
in the building would be corrected and the 
structure "made right" they had no idea how 
extensive the defects were or the extent of the 
cost and work involved; and, when the full extent 
of the problem was realized, defendants repudiated 
their promise.) 
(5) The Promise was Made for the Purpose of Inducing the 
Other Party to Act Upon it: (i.e. plaintiffs intended 
that defendants rely upon their representation so that 
defendants could attempt to repair the defects at minimum 
costs and work; whereas, if plaintiffs had engaged the 
services of another contractor, that contractor would 
have been required to use first class workmanship and 
materials throughout the repair, which would have cost 
defendants more money in the event they were ultimately 
held liable for the defects in the construction; further, 
- 9 -
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defendants intended to and did induce plaintiffs to 
forbear from filing a lawsuit and establishing 
plaintiffs' claims for damages by utilizing a competent 
contractor to complete the necessary repair work.) 
(6) The Plaintiffs Acted Reasonably and in Ignorance of 
the Falsity of Plaintiffs' Statements: (i.e. plaintiffs 
did not know and had no reason to believe that defendants 
did not intend to fulfill their promise to correct all 
defects in a satisfactory and workmanlike manner using 
first class workmanship and materials throughout; 
consequently, plaintiffs1 belief of defendants' 
statements was not unreasonable under the circumstances.) 
(7) Plaintiffs did in Fact Rely Upon Defendants' 
Promise: (i.e. plaintiffs relied upon defendants' 
promise to stand behind their work, "make it right" and 
correct the defects in their forbearance from filing suit 
against defendants and forbearance from engaging the 
services of competent subcontractors to perform the 
repair work; instead plaintiffs allowed the defendants to 
undertake the repairs and remedial work, select the 
workmen, materials and method of repair.) 
(8) Plaintiffs Were Thereby Induced to Act: (i.e. but 
for defendants' promises and assurances, plaintiffs would 
have filed suit in 1988 and engaged the services of 
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competent and experienced subcontractors and insisted 
that the repairs be done using first class workmanship 
and materials throughout all repair work; because of 
defendants' promises, plaintiffs allowed the defendants 
to select the workmen and materials and the method of 
repair which ultimately turned out to be shoddy, 
defective and ineffective in correcting the defects.) 
(9) Plaintiffs Have Been Injured and Damaged: (i.e. 
plaintiffs have been injured and damaged due to the fact 
that the repairs were not properly performed resulting in 
additional damages from water leakage to the interior and 
exterior improvements and structure of the home that 
would not have occurred if the work had been correctly 
done the second time. In addition, plaintiffs have 
suffered 3 years of inconvenience and inability to use 
and enjoy their home and are now incurring expense in 
defending a counterclaim for the cost of performing the 
work that was originally represented to be done at no 
cost to the plaintiffs. By reason of plaintiffs' 
forbearance from suit and allowing defendants to attempt 
the repairs, plaintiffs still have a defective structure 
in need of repair and are now incurring substantial 
attorneys' fees in defending the counterclaim which would 
not exist but for plaintiffs' forbearance.) 
- 11 -
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21. The above acts were malicious and/or were performed 
and carried out with reckless indifference to the economic 
consequences to the plaintiffs and said acts were done with 
total indifference toward the injury and damage o the 
property and loss to others thereby entitling plaintiffs to 
recover punitive damages. 
WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs pray judgment against the 
defendants jointly and severally as follows: 
V. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
1. Pursuant to plaintiffs1 First Claim for Relief, 
Negligence, plaintiffs pray the court enter judgment in their 
favor and against the defendants for damages in an amount 
equal to the costs of repairs and for the loss of use and 
enjoyment of their home plus damages to the contents 
commensurate with the evidence adduced at time of trial. 
2. Pursuant to plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief, 
Strict Liability, that the court render judgment in their 
favor and against the defendants in an amount equal to the 
costs of repair of the structure plus damage to the contents 
together with loss of use and enjoyment of their home 
commensurate with the evidence adduced at time of trial. 
3. Pursuant to plaintiffs1 Third Claim for Relief, 
Declaratory Judgment, that the court grant judgment in their 
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favor and against the defendants invoking the Doctrine of Res 
Ipsa Loquitur at time of trial. 
4. Pursuant to plaintiffs' Fourth Claim for Relief, 
Negligent and/or Intentional Misrepresentation, that the court 
enter judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the 
defendants in an amount commensurate with the evidence adduced 
at time of trial together with an award of punitive damages in 
the sum of $100,000. 
5. For such other and additional relief as the court 
shall deem just necessary and appropriate in accordance with 
Rule 54(c)(1) U.R.C.P. 
DATED this 4th day of November, 1991. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
Martin R. Denney 
lar\k A. Larsen 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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GARY B. FERGUSON (A1062) 
KURT M. FRANKENBURG (A5279) 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Third-Party Plaintiffs 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
Telephone: (801) 521-5678 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT D. MAACK and JUDITH 
MAACK, ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
OF DISMISSAL 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RESOURCE DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION, 
INC., a Utah corporation, and 
TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, an 
individual, Civil No. 900903201CV 
Defendants. Hon. Pat B. Brian 
RESOURCE DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
and TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, an 
individual. 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT JARVIK, M.D. 
Third-Party Defendant. 
Based upon the Motion for Voluntary Dismissal filed by 
defendant Resource Design in this action, and good cause 
appearing therefore, it is, hereby, 
By. 
FILES BiSYMCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 1 7 1992 
SALT LA^S COUNTY 
/ \ Deputy Clerk 
i 
002219 
ORDERED, AJUDGED AND DECREED that all counterclaims of 
defendant Resource Design asserted against plaintiffs in the 
above-entitled action be, and the same hereby are, dismissed 
without prejudice, each of the parties to bear their own costs 
incurred herein. 
DATED this / 'T 
r\ 
day of V-- /s.sr* 
BY THE COURT f) 
1992. 
HONORABLE PAT BT BRIAIT 
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